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BULLETIN NO. 8898

25X1A

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	25X1A	Capture Data
01-1571-68 (72 page original, handwritten.) (B)	<p>(C) 3d NVA Div, MR 5.</p> <p>(C) Record Book, with entries dated from 13 Oct to 15 Dec 67, maintained by Công Trường 2 subordinate to Nông Trường 3 /poss. Quyết Chiến Regt, 3d NVA Div/, contains copies of messages sent from Nông Trường 3 to Công Trường 2, and from Xóm 1, Xóm 2 and Xóm 3 /poss. 1st, 2d and 3rd Bn of Quyết Chiến Regt/ to Công Trường 2.</p> <p>Message, dated 14 Oct 67, from Trinh to Kiêm Ha and Phiết, reveals that on 7 Oct 67, a counter sweep operation was conducted at Vĩnh Viễn by Xóm 1 which resulted in 60 enemy FWMAF/RVNAF KIA and four aircraft downed. Xóm 1 sustained eight KIA and 22 WIA.</p> <p>Message, dated 15 Oct 67, from Trinh to Kiêm Ha and Phiết, reveals that personnel of Xóm 1 were demoralized. Additionally, two-thirds of the personnel of Xóm 1 suffered from cankers and one half had malaria.</p> <p>Message, dated 17 Oct 67, from Tai of Nông Trường 3 to Công Trường 2, directs Công Trường 2 and Công Trường 12 /poss Quyết Thắng Regt, 3d NVA Div/ to move to unspecified areas and Công Trường 22 /poss. 1st Bn of 3d Regt, 3d NVA Div/ to the Western and Eastern areas of An Lão River (former location of the 40th Bn of the 3d NVA Div). The Message also directs each Công Trường to leave one Bn to operate in the former area of activity.</p> <p>Message, dated 17 Oct 67, from Sơn to Ha, Kiêm and Phiết, reveals that the element headed by Ngõ fell into an enemy ambush at Lắc Sơn Pass. Ngõ, Cảnh and one recon agent were KIA.</p> <p>Undated Message from Sơn to unspecified addressee reports that 30 members of the 81mm Mortar Co suffered from cankers, and that malaria prevailed in the Co. The situation of the Co became worse due to shortage of medicine and food.</p>		<p>18 Dec 67 CRO54735 2/5 Cav, 2/1st US Air Cav Div. Received CDEC 10 Jan 68.</p>

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	<p>Message, dated 20 Oct 67, from Tai and Khanh of Nông Trưởng 3, directs Công Trưởng 2 to deploy one Bn to Northern Phú Mỹ, one Bn to Southern Phú Mỹ and one Bn to Southern Hoài An and Mỹ Lđi and be ready to launch an attack on enemy Marine Bn. Concurrently, Công Trưởng 2 had to mount heavy pressure on Route #1 to allow <u>VC</u> Local Troops and Guerrilla Units to step up military actions to support the uprising of the local population.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 23 Oct 67, from Trinh to Ha and Kiêm, reveals that the Replacement Contingent headed by Phuong was strafed and bombed by enemy aircraft at Đà Tượng Stream. Phuong was KIA and five recruits of subject Group defected. Trinh further reveals that Kom 1 was facing critical shortage of food and medicine and its personnel was demoralized. Subsequent Message, dated 6 Nov 67, from Khai to Kiêm and Ha, reports that the Replacement Contingent headed by Phuong and composed of 121 recruits armed with 18 RPD, three R40, 21 GKC and 47 AK, sustained a heavy airstrike at Đà Tượng. 89 out of the 121 recruits were either KIA, WIA or MIA. Weapons lost included 18 RPD, three R40, 20 GKC and 39 AK. Of the 32 recruits remaining, 18 were assigned to Kom 1, nine to Kom 2; four to the Recon Unit and one to the <u>Security</u> Guard Unit.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 26 Oct 67, from Tỷng to Ha and Pô, reveals that rice stored at Đức Sơn was destroyed by enemy forces.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 26 Oct 67, from Sơn to Ha and Kiêm, reveals that the enemy maintained heavy pressure on Đà Tượng and "354". Therefore, Sơn requests that another liaison line be established and suggests utilizing another path from Thịnh Văn to Mỹ Trinh, Đà Tượng Stream and "426". In addition, this path with its three stations established at Nước Mặn, Bình An and "436" would facilitate the transportation and liaison operations. Sơn further informs addressees that the rice depot was moved from Ba Đồi to "436".</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 21 Oct 67, from Tiết to Ha, discloses that the second Replacement contingent composed of 500 men headed by Thùa, Minh and Kiêm was moving to its destination.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 26 Oct 67, from Sơn to Ha, discloses that the Weapons were shipped to "436" and the Dispensary was relocated to "436". However, its 107 patients were still at Nui Mountain Lòn.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 29 Oct 67, from Trưởng to Ha</p>	

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	<p>and Sanh, reports that the RR Unit and Công 1 [poss Staff Section, Quyet Chiến Regt] were facing critical shortage of food.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 30 Oct 67, from Tai and Khanh of Nông Trưởng 3, directs Công Trưởng 2 to launch an attack with the commitment of the entire Regt, to annihilate an important enemy element. The Message recommends Công Trưởng 2 to coordinate with the Local Troops to attack My Chanh in order to attract enemy reinforcements which are expected to move from My Tho to My Chanh or from Phu My Dist to My Chanh.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 31 Oct 67, from Sanh to Ha and Kiêm, reveals that the 81mm Mortar Co would coordinate with Unit 300 [Sapper Unit of 3d NVA Div] to launch the planned attack. During the movement to the staging areas, three combatants of the 81mm Mortar Co were WIA and two of them were captured by the enemy. Sanh further informs Ha and Kiêm that his Unit was ready to receive the two replacement contingents and Xóm 3, however, serious difficulties were encountered in messing and billeting due to intense enemy activities.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 2 Nov 67, from Sanh to Ha and Kiêm, reports that enemy forces launched an attack on the location of Xóm 1. 60 US servicemen were KIA. Xóm 1 sustained two KIA and two WIA.</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 3 Nov 67, from Sanh to Ha and Kiêm, reports that the element of Xóm 1 in charge of shipping rice for the recruits fell into an enemy trap and was hit and sustained three KIA. Sanh further reveals that Xóm 1 was working out a plan to attack target "29-31".</p>	
	<p>Message, dated 6 Nov 67, from Khai to Kiem lists the following ammunition and ordnance items which were shipped to Đa Tường:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10,500 rounds of German Rifle ammo. - 1,051 rounds of 12.7mm MG ammo. - 51 rounds of 57mm RR ammo. - 30 rounds of 75mm RR ammo. - 38 rounds of B40 ammo. - 51 rounds of 82mm Mortar ammo. - 68 shaped-charge grenades. - 150 primers. 	
	<p>Message, dated 6 Nov 67, from Sanh to Ha and Kiêm, reports that the Dispensary was moved to "436" and the Training School to My Lai.</p>	

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Message, dated 9 Nov 67, from Luật to Ha, reports that on 10 Nov 67, Xóm 3 launched an attack on the enemy strongpoint at the Southern area of Vé River. 30 enemy troops were KIA and two others captured. Subsequent Message, dated 16 Nov 67, from Trung to Ha, reports that Xóm 3 failed to annihilate the target during the attack conducted on 10 Nov 67, and sustained four KIA and 11, WIA. On 31 Oct 67, during its withdrawal, Xóm 3 fell into enemy ambush at Hành Thinh and suffered 12 KIA including Tho, Polit Off of C2; eight WIA including Bé, Bn Chief of Staff; and seven KIA. The unit also lost one Btl, two RPD, five CCK, three AK and one K50. Personnel of Xóm 3 were demoralized by this failure. Luật further reports that Trương was appointed Polit Off of the 1st Co.; Phượng, Polit Off of the 2d Co; Nang, Polit Off of the 3d Co; and Lúy, Polit Off of the 4th Co. Luật also reveals that Xóm 3 was moved to Núi Lòn after the attack.

Message, dated 12 Nov 67, from Dương to Ha and Kiêm, reports that on 10 Nov 67, the Sapper Unit of the ~~1~~ 3d NVA ~~7~~ Div in coordination with the local forces of Hoai An, the heavy Weapon Unit of ~~1~~ Quyết Chiến ~~7~~ Regt and that of Xóm 1, launched an attack on the ~~1~~ GVN ~~7~~ Self-defense Unit at Hoai An, shelled the Dist Seat and Núi Chợ Post. 20 ~~1~~ GVN ~~7~~ self-defense personnel were KIA and 26 others captured.

Message, dated 9 Nov 67, from Trực to Nông Trưởng 3, c/o Công Trưởng 2, reports that in Sep and Oct 67, the 95th Bn ~~1~~ of 2d Regt ~~7~~ attacked US forces at Quang Nghênh and succeeded in putting two enemy Co's out of action. Concurrently the Bn ~~1~~ 2d Regt ~~7~~ engaged the US / RVNAT elements operating in Lai Nhông, Phù Ma, Phù Thủ and Mỵ Đức and put a total of 350 enemy troops out of action and shot down four aircraft.

Message, dated 7 Nov 67, from Sơn to Kiêm and Ha, reveals that 82P was directed by Nông Trưởng 3 to move to Trịnh Văn, Trung Hồi, and Lạc Sơn (Mỹ Trinh) and to Mỹ Hiệp. 18P would be in the western area of the Route and 28P on the eastern area of the Route. Sơn further discloses that Xóm 3 was allowed to get rice from Mỵ Lộc.

Message, dated 16 Nov 67, from Trực to Công Trưởng 2 and Hồng Trưởng 3, informs that Xóm 1 and Xóm 2 would probably concentrate their forces to conduct the illusined attack. Therefore

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Trắc was requested to prepare the messing and billeting for Xóm 1, Unit 130 and Unit 150. Sơn reveals that on 2 Dec 67, his group would move to the location of Trắc, as are the groups of Kiêm and Hả. The groups headed by Sơn, Hả and Kiêm would move through the commo line from Van An to Van Phú and would contact Trắc at the house of Giầy in Van Dinh Hamlet, Mỹ Lộc Vill 7.

Message, dated 15 Nov 67, from Lâm to Công Trưởng 2, informs addressee that on 21 Apr year unspecified 7, Lục would proceed to Công Trưởng 2. Therefore, Công Trưởng 2 was directed to send its men to receive Lục at Mỹ Lộc, Mỹ Tho Vill.

Message, dated 19 Nov 67, prepared by Quang and addressed to Công Trưởng 2, reveals the following information:

- Upon accomplishment of its mission in F3 X2, X4 and G4, Công Trưởng 2 was to direct its Engineer and Heavy Weapon Units to attack the US Airborne element on High Point 321 and the enemy Mechanized element which reinforced the 1st Bn in Mỹ Tho (Chánh Giao and Chánh Trực).

- On the night of "Bac" Lit. Silver, the Local Co was to suppress the "tyrants" and GVN 7 Self-defense personnel at X2, F3, UF3, X2, X4 and G4 and destroy the Strategic Hamlet. The Guerrilla Units were to break the GVN 7 control at Mỹ Quang, Mỹ Hòa, Mỹ Tài, Mỹ Chánh and Mỹ Tho so as to support the uprising of the local population.

- On the night of "Bac" and on the following day efforts must be made to destroy routes, raid lines of communication especially the portions linking Phú Cú and Bình Dương, Phú Mỹ and Phú Lý, and shoot at low flying aircraft and ships sailing along the coast.

- On the days following the "climaxing week," efforts must be made to launch repeated attacks on Dist Seats, lines of communication and areas adjacent to the GVN 7 controlled Villages. Concurrently, friendly VC 7 forces must encircle the enemy to support the uprising of the local population. The Main force Units must be ready to annihilate an important element of both US and "puppet" forces and also make preparations for the second phase of the plan.

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	<p>During the Second Phase, the 2d Regt <u>Quyet</u> Chiến Regt <u>7</u> was to coordinate with the Sapper Bn and Heavy Weapon Units of Nồng Trưởng 3 to attack the <u>RVNAF</u> <u>7</u> 41st Regt and the <u>US</u> <u>7</u> Airborne element which is expected to land on the battlefield to reinforce the 41st Regt. Concurrently, the Local Co was to attack the Dist Seats and Military bases, and the Guerrilla Units were to step up activities in areas surrounding the Dist Seats to support the uprising of the local population.</p>	
	<p>During the opening week of the campaign, unspecified <u>VC</u> <u>7</u> forces were to attack the "puppet" Co located on Đồi Tránh and other "enemy" elements operating in the "Central Area" (J4, Y3, T6 and G3) to permit the <u>VC</u> <u>7</u> 2d Regt to concentrate its forces to annihilate a Bn subordinate to the "enemy" 41st Regt which was reinforced by a Mechanized element to operate in the "Central area" (J4, Y3, X2, F5, Y3, T6 and G3). The Local Co might be used to maintain heavy pressure on Rđ. Rđ. to allow the 2d Regt to move to Mý Hòa and Mý Trinh to annihilate a Bn subordinate to the "enemy" 41st Regt or a Marine Bn. In addition, the 2d Regt must be ready to attack the <u>US</u> <u>7</u> Airborne element which would land on the rear line. Concurrently, the Sapper Bn of Nồng Trưởng 3 in coordination with an infantry element of the 2d Regt was to conduct shellings on J1, J5, J2, F5 and G2 where the "enemy" 41st Regt HQ was located.</p>	
	<p>The Local Co was to attack Rđ. Rđ. and occupy it for a time while the Guerrilla Units were to attack the enemy elements spreaded out in the areas surrounding the Dist Seats. Armed element of Mý Tài, Mý Chanh, Mý Tho and Mý Hiệp were to encircle the "enemy" forces which were operating in the local areas.</p>	
	<p>Emphasis would be placed on the conduct of intensive raids on lines of communication especially the two portions between Vạn An and Bình Dương, Phú Mỹ and Phú Lý.</p>	
	<p>During the First Phase of the Campaign repeated attacks must be launched on Dist Seats to support the uprising of the local population. Preparations must also be made to counter enemy sweep operations. The 2d Regt was directed to work out a combat plan to launch attacks with the commitment of the entire Regt on Mý Lộc, Mý Đức and Mý Lđia.</p>	

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Message, dated 26 Nov 67, from Nông Trưởng to the "Central Area" and Khanh and Lực, directs addressees to concentrate their forces in the attack of towns, Dist Seats and Route #1. The Message reveals that the combat plan pertaining to the attack on Mỹ Thành was postponed to permit subject forces to carry out the second combat plan. The Message discloses that an attack must be launched on BH28 and Rú Rέ. After the attack, VC forces would concentrate to attack the enemy reinforcements moving to Mỹ Hòa, Mỹ Quang and Mỹ Trinh. Concurrently, intense raids on enemy rear areas by local troops Militia Forces and Sapper elements must be conducted to annihilate "tyrants" and break GVN control in order to support the uprising of the local population aimed at liberating the villages surrounding BH28. The Main Force Units and the Sapper elements after launching the attack on BH28 must strive to gain control of the areas adjacent to BH28 and prepare the battlefield to counter enemy reinforcements. They must destroy their troops in Co size which could give mutual assistance in the village surrounding the Dist to effectively disorganize the enemy reinforcement and destroy them and also to create a favorable situation for a second and consecutive attack on the Dist Seat.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: Original passed to TRU.

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